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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15353

-vsMICHAEL PAUL ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Michael Paul Adams, was charged with
murder in the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of the lesser and
included offense of manslaughter and sentenced to a term of
not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 21, 1976, the appellant, Michael Paul
Adams, entered the Crest Club in Murray, Utah, with Sharon
Blood (T.65).

The Crest Club is a private club with a

bar where liquor is served to members.

At the time the

appellant and Sharon Blood arrived, other club members
were present in the bar area, including Charles Goodman
and Gerald Braithwaite (T.63-64).

The appellant and Blood

were acquainted with Goodman, and they sat near him at the
bar and had a conversation with him.

Initially, appellant

and Goodman discussed phone calls that appellant's wife
had allegedly made to Goodman's wife.

Goodman testified

that the conversation went no further (T.76, 85-87), but
several other witnesses testified that Goodman claimed,
in vulgar language, to have had sexual intercourse with
appellant's wife (T.192,223,228,271-275,318).

Appellant

then left Goodman, but when he returned he pointed a loaded
revolver at Goodman's head and stated, "I am going to kill
you, you son-of-a-bitch."
276,323,335).

(T.70,116,152-153,175,192,240,

The threat was repeated several times.

After

Goodman was unable to persuade the appellant to put the gun
down, he turned his back to the appellant and faced the bar
(T.71).

Appellant then struck Goodman behind his right ear
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with the gun (T.71,118,175,241,337-338).

Goodman was dazed

by the blow, and appellant again pointed his gun at Goodman
and said, "Now you're a dead son-of-a-bitch." (T.71,118).
Three events then occurred in rapid succession:

Gerry

Braithwaite came between the appellant and Goodman in an
attempt to halt the fight (T.154,176,224-225), the appellant's
gun went off and inflicted a fatal wound on Braithwaite (T.5556, 71-72,120,154,176,258), and Ken Bates, an
off-duty, unarmed Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff threw a
heavy, sharp-edged, glass ashtray at the appellant (T.118-119,
177,243-244).

The ashtray struck the appellant on the right

side of his face and caused severe damage to his right eye
(T.201-203,339).

After the first shot had been fired,

Goodman fled from the club, and the appellant fired two more
shots in Goodman's direction (T.50,71-72,122-123,157,178,194).
Appellant testified in his own behalf, and admitted
pointing the loaded weapon at Goodman and bhreatening to kill
him (T.323,335).

Appellant claimed, however, that he did not

intend to shoot Goodman and that he was afraid Goodman had
a gun and would try to harm appellant's wife, Carol, who was
coming to the club (T.324).

Appellant testified that he

did not intentionally pull the trigger of the murder weapon
and that he had no memory of firing the gun (T.339-341).
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During the State's case in chief, Lieutenant
Oscar Hendrickson of the Salt Lake City Police, a firearm's
expert, testified that the trigger on the murder weapon was
harder to pull than on an average double-action revolver
(T.165-166).

In response to a hypothetical question, the

witness gave his opinion that it was not reasonable to
believe that the trigger could have been unintentionally
pulled through reflex (T.170).

Additionally, two of the

State's witnesses testified that the first shot was fired
before the ashtry struck the appellant (T.177,243-244).
The State sought to introduce rebuttal evidence
of a statement made by the appellant to the officer who
arrested him, Joel Riet

(T.372).

Appellant objected to the

proposed evidence because there was an insufficient foundation to show that appellant's constitutional rights were
explained to him or that the statements were made voluntarily
in view of the injury to appellant's eye (T.373).

The state

offered to lay this foundation, and the appellant requested
that it be done out of the presence of the jury (T.374,375).
The request was granted, and Officer Riet
of the jury's presence (T.378-384).

was examined out

The appellant then

renewed his objection to the evidence, and the objection
was overruled (T.384).

The court did grant appellant's

request that the trial be continued to the following morning.
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Id.

When trial resumed, the appellant offered two further

objections to the evidence:

first, appellant claimed

surprise because of the prosecutions' failure to honor an
informal agreement to provide all witnesses' statements,
and second, appellant was denied his right against selfincrimination because he took the stand unaware of the
State's rebuttal evidence (T.386).

The court denied the

motion to suppress the evidence on both grounds (T.391).
Appellant then moved the court for a hearing out of the
jury's presence on the voluntariness of the appellant's
statement.

Id.

The prosecutor stated that he had no

objection to further questioning of Officer Riet
the jury's presence (T.398).

out of

Appellant rejected this

offer, and stated that he desired a hearing with
additional witnesses.

Id.

The court held that the state-

ment was made voluntarily, and denied the request for
further hearings (T.404).
exarnined Officer Riet

However, the appellant cross-

out of the jury's presence before

his testimony was put before the jury (T.405-413).

In the

presence of the jury, the officer testified that he had asked
appellant what had happened, and that appellant had replied,
"Well, I had to shoot the man.
at once.

They were corning at me all

And I can handle one or two at a time but I can't

handle five at once."

(T.416-417).

The trial court ruled

that this statement was not a confession (T.450).
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The appellant proposed no instructions on the
subject of the weight to be given the officer's testimony,
and stated that he would not except to the court's failure
to give one (T.450-451).

During closing argument, the

prosecutor commented on the appellant's explanation of
his actions (T.483).

The appellant did not object at

that time, but later moved for a mistrial on the grounds
that the statement commented on the failure of appellant's
wife to testify (T.538).

The motion was denied.

Id.

The

jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser included
offense of manslaughter, and it is from this conviction
that this appeal is taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMITING THE
HEARING ON THE VOLUNTARINESS OF APPELLANT'S ADMISSION TO
OFFICER RIET'S TESTIMONY.
A.

APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY

DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS BECAUSE HIS STATEMENT WAS
AN "ADMISSION" AND NOT A "CONFESSION.
In State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 602,
126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942), this court defined admission
and confessions:

-6-
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"A confession is an admission
of guilt by the defendant of all the
necessary elements of the crime of
which he is charged, including the
necessary acts and intent. An admission
merely admits some fact which connects
or tends to connect the defendant with
the offense but not with all the
elements of the crime."
The courts of other jurisdictions have also adopted these
"well drawn distinctions" and have cited Masato with
approval.
App. 1976).

Fletcher v. State, 352 N.E.2d 517, 522 (Ind.
Appellant's statement contained a claim of

self-defense and did not admit all elements of the offense,
and is therefore not a confession.

At trial, the court

held that the statement was not a confession (T.450), and
appellant's counsel conceded it was not a confession (T.392).
The cases cited by appellant refer only to confessions and
are therefore not in point.

As this Court noted in Masato,

supra at 602, 126 P.2d at 1052:
"
• The great weight of
authority and the better reasoned
cases hold that before receiving
an admission--as distinguished from
a confession--in evidence, it is not
necessary that a preliminary showing
be made to the effect that the statement was voluntary."
This holding was followed in State v. Hymas, 102 Utah 371, 374,
131 P.2d 791, 793 (1942).

Respondent submits that the court.

below did not err in admitting appellant's admission in evidence.
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B.

THE APPELLANT WAS ALLOWED TO PRESENT ALL

RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO THE COURT BEFORE THE ADMISSION WAS
GIVEN TO THE JURY.
This Court thoroughly discussed the principles
that govern the review of a trial court's determination
that an admission was voluntary in State v. Louden, 15
Utah 2d 64, 68-69, 387 P.2d 240, 243-244 (1963), vacated
on other grounds, 379

u.s.

1 (1964):

"But the procedure for determining
voluntariness is open to some question.
It should be born firmly in mind
that it would be the receipt of such
unreliable evidence, and not the variation from some suggested method for
determining its reliability, which
would constitute prejudicial error.
There is no statutory mandate as to
the procedure to be followed.
Nor
should there be any rigid and inviolable
one. The
which devolves upon the
trial court is to adopt and follow some
procedure which will guard against the
admission of spurious confessions or
admissions. How this is done may vary
somewhat depending upon the circumstances
of each case, and the court should have
considerable latitude of discretion as
to how to protect the right of the defendant
in that regard.
If that purpose is served,
the fact that the course adopted may vary
from some other procedure which may also
have been deemed permissible, should not
result in the reversal of the conviction.
It must be borne in mind that the court
has not only the duty mentioned to the
defendant, it must also safeguard the rights
of the State. Furthermore, it has the
responsibility of seeing that the trial
moves forward in an orderly manner with
such reasonable expedition as can be
achieved consistent with looking after the
interests of both sides of the controversy.

dl.l'fi
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It would be quite impractical to
halt the main trial, excuse the jury,
and conduct a collateral trial on the
question of voluntariness of an
admission or a confession every
time defense counsel might make an
objection. While this has indeed
been approved as proper procedure
under circumstances which require it,
it should be done only when there is
presented such a genuine and substantial
issue as to voluntariness that in the
court's judgment there is some real
possibility that permitting the jury to
hear the evidence would so prejudice
their minds that the defendant could
not have a fair trial."
In this case, the appellant requested the trial
court to halt the trial after both sides had presented their
case in chief, and conduct a hearing on the voluntariness
of the admission that would include testimony by the arresting
officer, the appellant, and all other officers involved in
the case (T.391).

Appellant's counsel expected the hearing

to be extensive, and to involve a number of witnesses (T.392).
Appellant was not granted the extended hearing he requested,
but was allowed to question the arresting officer on voir
dire and to cross-examine him (T.378-384,405-413).

The

appellant himself testified that he could not remember making
the statement (T.442-445).

There is no evidence in the record

that anyone other than the appellant and the arresting
officer was present when the statement was made (T.399).
Appellant's only proffer of proof as to what he hoped to
establish from the other officer's testimony was the fact
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that they had also asked appellant for a statement and
that they had never known that Officer Riet had taken a
statement from the appellant.

Id.

While this testimony

might be relevant to the issue of whether the admission
was made at all, respondent submits that it would have
been irrelevant to the issue of whether the admission
was made voluntarily.

Respondent submits that the court

below gave appellant an opportunity to explore all
relevant evidence going to the voluntariness of the
admission and refused to exclude the admission as
involuntary (T.373,384,303).

The court's finding is

supported by substantial evidence; the officer testified
that appellant stated he understood his constitutional
rights, appeared to be coherent, and refused to answer
further questions after the statement was made (T.380).
Respondent submits that the trial court did not err
either in limiting the hearing to Officer Riet's testimony,
or in finding that the admission was made voluntarily.
The court adopted a procedure that protected defendant's
rights, and the court's finding is supported by substantial
evidence.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE
A SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION ON THE OFFICER'S CREDIBILITY AS
A WITNESS.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

THE CLAIMED ERROR WAS INVITED BY APPELLANT.

Appellant's counsel stated that he had no
instructions to offer on the subject of the appellant's
admission or the officer's testiMony, that he would take
no exception to the court's failure to give an instruction,
and that the court's procedure in instructing the jury on
this point was proper (T.450-451). Appellant may not take
advantage of a claimed error that he has invited.
Olsson, No. 15040 (Utah, October 31, 1977).

State v.

Appellant's

point II on appeal is, therefore, not a grounds for reversal.
B.

THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON

ITS DUTY TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY OF THE
OFFICER'S TESTIMONY.
The competency of an admission as evidence is a
question for the court, but the weight to be given an
admission is a question for the jury.
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943).

State v. Crank, 105

The jury members in this

case were instructed that they were the sole and final
judges of all questions of fact, and that they had the duty
to decide how much weight should be given to each witnesses'
testimony (R.77,123).

Appellant contends that these·

instructions are inadequate, however, because the jury was

-11-
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not instructed that it had the duty to determine the weight
of the officer's testimony regarding appellant's admission.
In State v. Vaughn, 554 P.2d 210, 211 (Utah 1976), this
Court held that it wasnoterror to refuse a request for
an instruction on credibility of a particular witness
and stated:
"The trial court is in the
best position to determine what
lengths of specificity or
emphasis he will indulge with
each particular witness of this
type, and anyway and after all
the jury analyzes and inventories
what degree of credibility it will
attach to a witness."
Respondent submits that Vaughn controls this case, and that
it was not error to fail

~

sponte to give a specifc

instruction on the credibility of the officer's testimony.
Further, respondent submits that appellant could have
presented any evidence he may have had that the admission
was involuntary to the jury (T.398).

Appellant can claim

no error that evidence of the admission's voluntariness
was not given to the jury.

Respondent asserts that the

court and jury properly performed their respective roles,
as outlined in Crank, supra.

The court found the evidence

competent (T.384,404), and the jury was instructed to
weigh all the evidence and determine which witnesses were
truthful (R.77,123).

The conviction should be affirmed.
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POINT III
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
ON THE GROUNDS OF SURPRISE.
Appellant objected to the introduction of
Officer Riet's rebuttal evidence on the ground of
surprise, and the court overruled the objection
(T.386,391).

Respondent avers that this ruling was

correct because the prosecution was under no duty to
reveal the rebuttal evidence to the defense prior to
trial.

No duty to disclose existed because the evidence

was not favorable to the defense, it was used only on
rebuttal, and no specific request for disclosure had
been made.
As to the first point, respondent asserts that
the prosecutionisonly obligated to disclose evidence that
is favorable to the defense.

Appellant has cited United

States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1972), for
the proposition that the prosecution must disclose all
evidence "crucial to the question of appellant's guilt
or innocence."

(Brief of appellant, page 20).

The

quotation from Bryant, supra, is incomplete; the court
actually said that the evidence was:

-13-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"
• • crucial to the question
of appellant's guilt or innocence.
That fact, coupled with the unavoidable
possibility that the [evidence] might
have been significantly 'favorable'
to the accused is enough to bring these
cases within constitutional concern."
Bryant at 648.
(Emphasis added.)
Although Bryant discusses constitutional rights, an examination
of the case shows that the holding was based, at least in part,
on Rule 16, Fed. R. Crim. P., and the Jencks Act, 18
3500 (1970).

u.s.c.

Utah has no analogous statute or rule.

submits that Bryant is of no aid to appellant.

Respondent

To the contrary,

respondent concludes that this issue is controlled by this
Court's discussion in State v. Dowell, 30 Utah 2d 323, 517
P.2d 1016, appeal dismissed and cert. denied 417 U.S. 962
(1974), where this Court explained the cases requiring
disclosure of prosecution evidence:
"
• the court stated that it
of no constitutional requirement
that the prosecution must make a
complete and detailed accounting to
the defense of all poLice investigatory
work on a case. The court explained
that suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon a
defense production request violated due
process • • • The court cited the
following factors by which the conduct
of the prosecution was to be measured:
• • • (b) The evidence's favorable
character to the defense • • • • "
Dowell at 326, 517 P.2d at 1018.
~new

Respondent submits that the prosecution was under no duty
to disclose the evidence because it was not favorable to the
defense.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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§

Second, respondent submits that there was no
prosecution duty to disclose because the evidence was not
used in the State's case in chief, but only to rebut
appellant's claim that the shooting was accidental.
In State v. Harris, 14 Wash.App. 414, 542 P.2d 122, 126
(1975), the Court observed that:
"The prosecution is not required
•. to anticipate all facets of the
defendant's case and prepare for its
rebuttal case in advance of trial, and
it is under no obligation to unearth
statements made to possible rebuttal
witnesses and furnish them on demand."
(Emphasis in original.)
Respondent submits that the prosecution was not bound to
disclose possible rebuttal evidence prior to trial.
Thirdly, respondent contends that the informal
agreement between the prosecution and the appellant's
counsel was too general and vague to be enforced.

The

prosecutor understood the agreement differently than
appellant's counsel and did not believe that he had
violated it (T.388-389).

Assuming, however, that appel-

lant's description of the agreement was accurate, it required
the prosecution to disclose "all evidence that he intended
to use at trial."

(Brief of Appellant, page 18, T.389).

The appellant could not have asked the trial court to order
discovery that broad.

"A defendant's motion for discovery
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

must • • • describe the requested information with at least
some degree of specificity and must be sustained by
plausible justification."

People v. Superior Court, 70

Cal.Rptr. 480, 484 (1968); State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357,
517 P.2d 1315, cert. denied 418 U.S. 970, reh. denied
419 U.S. 887 (1974).

If the trial court could not have

ordered this kind of a "fishing expedition" in the first
instance, a fortiori it cannot indirectly enforce it by
penalizing the prosecution for failure to provide all
the material requested.

Further, the requested material

would have been exempt from any pre-trial discovery.
nReports compiled by law enforcement authorities in the
course of their investigation constitute the work product
of the state, and, as such, are privileged from pre-trial
discovery."

State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 99

Ariz. 382, 409 P.2d 547, 548 (1966).

Even assuming that

the report was not exempt from discovery, appellant's
failure to make a specific request for disclosure defeats
this claim of error.
If the failure to make a pre-trial disclosure
is considered error, respondent submits that the error
is harmless.

Any prejudice appellant may have suffered

due to surprise could have been remedied by a continuance
of the trial.

The record does not contain a request for
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a continuance, and appellant does not challenge any failure
to grant a continuance as error.

Appellant cannot legitimately

complain of prejudice due to surprise.

Further, limiting

the prejudice that might have resulted from non-disclosure
is the fact that Officer Riet had always been listed as a
State's witness in this case (T.389).

The substance of his

testimony could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, and a timely specific request for discovery of the
officer's report could have, therefore, been made.

Also,

appellant's counsel was given access to the report at the
time of trial, and he used the report effectively in crossexamining Officer Riet (T.417-439).
Appellant claims that if he had known about his
prior statement contained in Officer Riet's report, he might
have remained off of the witness stand.

However, a criminal

defendant always runs the risk that he might be contradicted
or attacked through evidence of a prior inconsistent statement
if he takes the stand.

The rebuttal evidence in this case

presented no unique possibilities of prejudice, and, therefore,
did not undermine the appellant's right against self-incrimination.
Appellant has cited no authority for his proposition that
unexpected rebuttal evidence abridges the right against selfincrimination, and respondent submits that no such authority'
exists.
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In conclusion, respondent submits that the
prosecution was under no duty to disclose the rebuttal
evidence prior to trial, and that appellant has
demonstrated no undue prejudice due to the non-disclosure.
The court below did not err in admitting the statement
in evidence.
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL ON THE GROUNDS OF AN
ALLEGED COMMENT ON THE FAILURE OF THE APPELLANT'S WIFE
TO TESTIFY.
A.

MISTRIAL WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE REMEDY.

The allegedly prejudicialremark occurred at
page 483 of the transcript.

The appellant did not, at

that time, object to the remark, request that i t be stricken,
or ask the court for a cautionary admonition.

The appellant

later made a motion for a mistrial which was denied (T.538).
The appellant rested on that motion and made no request
for a cautionary admonition.

Respondent avers that appel-

lant's failure to use a less drastic means of limiting the
possible prejudice to himself defeats his claim of error.
Mistrial is a drastic remedy that should only be
resorted to when other, less drastic, means of limiting
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possible prejudice are unavailable.

State v. Vaughn, supra.

If the prosecutor had commented on the failure of the
appellant's wife to testify, a cautionary instruction would
have been appropriate and would have cured any possible
prejudice.
(1972)~

State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113

Utah Rules of Evidence 39.

" • • • it is possible

for the trial judge to correct this error by a timely and
adequate admonition to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
statements and in support of the privileges not to testify
at trial."

(Brief of Appellant, page 23.)

In short, the

alleged error could have been corrected without declaring
a mistrial, but appellant made no attempt to do so.

This

failure defeats his claim of error.
B.

THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT DID NOT COMMENT

ON THE FAILURE OF APPELLANT'S WIFE TO TESTIFY.
Appellant's explanation for his act of pointing
a loaded gun at the intended victim Goodman was that he
feared Goodman had a gun and would harm his wife, who was
coming to the club (T.324).

The appellant testified that

he had called his wife and asked her not to come to the
club, but that he had been unable to dissuade her (T.321).
In closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to show that
this testimony was inherently incredible:
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"He warned Carol over the
phone. Could have--he said he talked
to her.
'Well, she's coming over.'
What did he tell her? He could tell
her, 'Carol, don't come.
I think
Charlie's got a gun and by God he's
going to come in here and kill you.
You're crazy for coming.' Well,
we don't know what he told her.
I suppose we'll never know what he
said to his wife."
(T.483).
The remark was intended by the prosecutor to point out gaps
and inconsistencies in the appellant's testimony, not to
refer to the fact that appellant's wife did not testify.
Appellant could have testified about what was said over
the

phone~

there was no need to call his wife to testify.

Respondent submits that no reasonable jury could infer
from the prosecutor's statement that appellant had kept
his wife

off the stand.

The prosecutor's statement was

not an express comment on the appellant's wife's failure
to testify, such as was involved in State v. Trusty, supra,
and State v. Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963).
Respondent submits that the prosecutor's statement was not
a comment on the appellant's exercise of an evidentiary
privilege.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities,
respondent submits that the judgment and sentence rendered
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below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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